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ABSTRACT 
 
The Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources 
and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from 
their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity 
presents a relatively new international legal framework. 
Although the United States is not currently bound by this 
legal instrument, its impact may be felt in the life sciences 
innovation sector and beyond. Transnational 
implementation mechanisms for the Nagoya Protocol have a 
combination of property law and contract law as their 
theoretical underpinning. Stakeholders who are entering 
into an agreement with their foreign counterparts should 
honor the Access and Benefit-Sharing scheme as well as 
domestic laws and policies of Parties to the Protocol to 
access biological materials located in their jurisdictions. 
Users’ due diligence in obtaining prior informed consent 
and adhering to mutually agreed terms will contribute 
greatly to promoting the objectives of the Nagoya Protocol 
and the Convention on Biological Diversity. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the 
Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization 
(“Nagoya Protocol” or “Protocol”)1 to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (“CBD” or “Convention”) 2  presents a relatively new 
international legal framework with respect to cross-border 
transactions of biological resources. The Nagoya Protocol most 
likely affects biotechnological, pharmaceutical, cosmetic, 
agricultural, food, and other industries that obtain non-human 
genetic materials from other countries for developing useful 
                                                                                                             
1 The Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and 
Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, opened for signature Feb. 2, 2011, U.N.T.S. A-30619 
(entered into force Oct. 12, 2014) [hereinafter Nagoya Protocol], 
https://www.cbd.int/abs/text/. 
2 Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature June 5, 1992, 
1760 U.N.T.S. 79 (entered into force Dec. 29, 1993) [hereinafter CBD], 
https://www.cbd.int/convention/text/. 
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biological products and processes. Although the United States is 
currently not a Party to the Convention,3 the treaty’s impact may be 
felt broadly in the life sciences innovation sector and beyond. 
This emerging global standard, in combination with the 
domestic law of the member states, creates complexities with regard 
to what steps a stakeholder must take to be legally compliant and 
accountable for their conduct when working with genetic resources 
and knowledge attributable to a particular geographic region or 
indigenous community. The implementation mechanisms for this 
international law in each jurisdiction essentially come down to 
contracts over the exchange of property between providers and 
users, reflecting individually negotiated and mutually agreed-upon 
terms (“MAT”). Regardless of the United States’ status as a non-
Party to the Nagoya Protocol, contractual obligations may be 
imposed on whoever wants to use biological resources of foreign 
origin under the Access and Benefit-Sharing (“ABS”) scheme. Such 
contractual terms will likely incorporate by reference relevant 
domestic laws of the resource provider. Users should defer to, rather 
than resist, the extraterritorial application of the provider country’s 
rules and policies. 
 
I. NAGOYA PROTOCOL BACKGROUND 
 
The Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the 
Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization 
to the Convention on Biological Diversity is an international 
agreement governing cross-border transactions of genetic resources. 
This legal instrument has been in effect since October 12, 2014.4 It 
is one of the supplementary agreements to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity,5 an umbrella treaty that has been universally 
adopted by almost the entire world except the United States. Largely 
                                                                                                             
3 As of 2018, the only other jurisdiction in the world that is not a Party to the 
Convention is Holy See, a church jurisdiction in Rome, Italy. See CBD List of 
Parties, https://www.cbd.int/information/parties.shtml. 
4 Nagoya Protocol, https://www.cbd.int/abs/. 
5 The other supplementary agreement to the Convention is the Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for 
signature May 15, 2000, 2226 U.N.T.S. 208 (entered into force Sept. 11, 2003), 
http://bch.cbd.int/protocol/text/. 
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unbeknownst to Americans, the Nagoya Protocol may have 
significant positive or negative impact on future global intellectual 
property strategies, particularly in the life sciences innovation field 
as discussed below. 
 
A.  Nagoya Protocol’s Objectives 
 
The Convention on Biological Diversity (“CBD”) is an 
international legally binding treaty with three main goals: the (1) 
conservation of biodiversity, (2) sustainable use of the components 
of biodiversity, and (3) equitable sharing of the benefits derived 
from the use of genetic resources. 6  The Nagoya Protocol, a 
supplementary agreement to the CBD, is the legal instrument 
developed specifically to implement the last of these three core 
goals: providing access to and sharing the benefits arising from the 
utilization of genetic resources in a fair and equitable manner.7 The 
Nagoya Protocol is intended to accomplish this objective by 
facilitating access to genetic resources, transferring relevant 
technologies and knowledge, and by allocating appropriate funding. 
By doing so, the Protocol strives to contribute to the other two 
primary goals of the CBD: conservation of biological diversity and 
the sustainable use of its components.8 
 
B.  Treaty Ratification Status 
 
The CBD is one of the multilateral agreements hosted by the 
United Nations Environment Programme (“UNEP”). The 
Convention was opened for signature at the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development—known as the Rio 
Earth Summit—in 1992 and entered into force in December 1993.9 
As of 2018, 196 countries—indeed, almost the entire world—have 
ratified the CBD.  
The Nagoya Protocol was adopted by the Conference of the 
                                                                                                             
6 CBD art. 1. 
7 Nagoya Protocol preamble; CBD art. 15. 
8 Nagoya Protocol arts. 1, 9. 
9 Nagoya Protocol intro, https://www.cbd.int/abs/doc/protocol/nagoya-
protocol-en.pdf. 
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Parties of the Convention at its tenth meeting in October 2010 in 
Nagoya, Japan. It was opened for signature in 2011-201210 and was 
entered into force in October 2014 pursuant to Article 33.11 As of 
April 2018, 105 countries—just over half of the 196 Parties to the 
CBD—have domesticated the instrument to become Parties to the 
Nagoya Protocol. 12  Once joined, member states may not make 
reservations; they are fully bound by the provisions of the Nagoya 
Protocol.13 The Secretariat to both the Convention and the Nagoya 
Protocol is located in Montreal, Canada, 14  although ironically 
Canada, a Party to the CBD, has yet to sign the Nagoya Protocol as 
of this writing. 
The United States remains a non-Party to both the Convention 
and the Nagoya Protocol. The CBD is a non-self-executing treaty 
under the United States’ laws, and thus by itself does not give rise 
to a domestically enforceable law. Instead, the U.S. government 
treats the CBD as an Article II treaty, for which the Constitution’s 
Treaty Clause requires that two-thirds of the Senate give its advice 
and consent, before the President may ratify the agreement.15 In 
June 1993, then-President Bill Clinton signed the Convention. 
However, the treaty has never received an affirmative vote of the 
Senate, partly due to its low priority status on the Congress’s 
political agenda.16 Because the United States has yet to become a 
                                                                                                             
10 Id. art. 32. 
11 Id. art. 33 (providing that the protocol would enter into force on the 90th 
day after the date of deposit of the 50th instrument of ratification, acceptance, 
approval or accession by States . . . that are party to the Convention). 
12 CBD, The Access and Benefit-Sharing Clearing-House [hereinafter 
ABSCH], https://absch.cbd.int/countries/status/party (last visited Mar. 1, 2018) 
(counting the European Union as among the 105 Parties to the Nagoya Protocol). 
13 Nagoya Protocol art. 34. 
14 CBD art. 24; Nagoya Protocol art. 28; CBD SECRETARIAT, 
https://www.cbd.int/secretariat/ (last accessed Mar. 1, 2018). 
15 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
16 See Original Resolution Expressing the Sense of the Senate Regarding 
Conditions for Continued United States Participation Under the Convention on 
Biological Diversity. S. Res. 239, 103rd Cong., 140 CONG. REC. 15822 (as 
reported by S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, July 11, 1994); see also Robert F. 
Blomquist, Ratification Resisted: Understanding America’s Response to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, 1989-2002, 32 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 
493, 499 (2002) (providing a chronological synopsis of the U.S. government’s 
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Party to the Convention, it is automatically ineligible to become a 
Party to the Nagoya Protocol pursuant to the CBD provision.17 
 
C.  Nagoya Protocol’s Vocabulary 
 
The Protocol’s use-of-terms and scope provisions are found in 
Articles 2 and 3, respectively. They incorporate and are consistent 
with the corresponding provisions of its parent treaty.18 In addition 
to genetic resources themselves, the Nagoya Protocol applies to 
traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources and to the 
benefits arising from the utilization of such traditional knowledge 
within the scope of the Convention.19 
However, neither the scope provision nor the use-of-terms 
provision is definitive enough to create a consensus among Parties 
over the meaning of key terms, such as “genetic resources” and 
“traditional knowledge,” which would facilitate communication 
about these important concepts with stakeholders. The term “genetic 
resources” seems intentionally excluded from the list of definitions 
in the Protocol. This obvious gap is filled by the Convention, which 
defines “genetic resources” merely as genetic material of actual or 
potential value;20 and “genetic material” as any material of plant, 
animal, microbial, or other origin containing functional units of 
heredity.21  
In fact, only five terms are defined under the Protocol Article 
2. 22  One such term is “utilization of genetic resources,” which 
Article 2 defines as the act of conducting research and development 
on the genetic and/or biochemical composition of genetic resources, 
including through the application of biotechnology. 23 
“Biotechnology” is defined as any technological application that 
uses biological systems, living organisms, or derivatives thereof, to 
                                                                                                             
response to the Convention). 
17 CBD art. 32(1). 
18 Nagoya Protocol arts. 2–3; CBD arts. 2, 4. 
19 Nagoya Protocol arts. 3, 12. 
20 CBD art. 2, para. 11. 
21 Id. art. 2, para. 9 (emphasis added). 
22 The remaining two terms listed under Article 2 are “Conference of the 
Parties” and “Convention.” Nagoya Protocol art. 2(a) & 2(b). 
23 Id. art. 2(c). 
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make or modify products or processes for specific use. 24 
“Derivative” is further defined as “a naturally occurring biochemical 
compound resulting from the genetic expression or metabolism of 
biological or genetic resources, even if it does not contain functional 
units of heredity.”25 Accordingly, the subject matter of the Nagoya 
Protocol should be construed much more broadly than just DNA 
itself. 
The only explicit threshold to the otherwise highly inclusive 
concept of “genetic resources” is that human genetic resources are 
excluded from the framework of the Protocol.26  Still, traditional 
knowledge associated with genetic resources of non-human origin 
is possessed by particular indigenous peoples or individuals, and 
therefore the Protocol still has legal and ethical implications 
specifically relating to human subjects research.27 In the treaty’s 
attempt to grasp the constantly evolving nature of life sciences and 
biotechnology fields, omitting a definition of “genetic resources” 
likely reflects the drafters’ intention to allow the scope of “genetic 
resources” to broaden in the future. This would allow the term to 
cover novel types of materials as they became available with 
advancements in technology and applications to a wider array of 
biological resources. For example, over the last several years, the 
Conferences of the Parties have considered whether to enlarge the 
scope of the Protocol to encompass such items as digital genetic 
                                                                                                             
24 Id. art. 2(d). 
25 Id. art. 2(e) (emphasis added). 
26 CBD, Decision Adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the CBD 
[COP] at its 10th Meeting X/1, Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and 
Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from Their Utilization, at 3, U.N. Doc. 
UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/1 (Oct. 29, 2010) (reserving the right to place human 
genetic resources within the scope of the Protocol by stating “without prejudice 
to the further consideration of this issue by the [COP]”). 
27 Cf. In the United States, the Federal Policy for the Protection of Human 
Subjects or “Common Rule” is federal regulations governing the protection of 
human subjects in research. 45 C.F.R. pt. 46 (1999); 82 Fed. Reg. 7149 (Jan. 19, 
2017) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 46); see also OFF. FOR HUMAN RESEARCH 
PROTS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., INTERNATIONAL COMPILATION 
OF HUMAN RESEARCH STANDARDS, 2018 EDITION (2018), 
https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/sites/default/files/2018-International-Compilation-of-
Human-Research-Standards.pdf (enumerating over 1,000 standards that govern 
human subjects research in 130 countries). 
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sequence information or microorganisms manipulated by synthetic 
biological techniques. 28  Although the underlying context is 
different, difficulty in delineating the scope and range of 
biotechnology subject matter is somewhat analogous to patent 
subject matter eligibility jurisprudence surrounding nucleic acids, 
proteins, and other biochemical compounds, which has 
independently developed under the patent laws of the U.S., 
European Union, and other jurisdictions.29 
Other legal terms of art that are not separately defined in the 
treaty provisions but are frequently used throughout the text of the 
Protocol include prior informed consent (“PIC”) and mutually 
agreed terms (“MAT”), in addition to Access and Benefit-Sharing 
(“ABS”) and its equivalent phrases. The following sections provide 
more context to these key terms as they are normally understood in 
the Nagoya Protocol’s ABS framework. 
 
D.  Nagoya Protocol’s Conceptual Framework 
 
The Nagoya Protocol asserts that the first two of the three pillars 
of the CBD are promoted through fulfilling its third and final goal—
fair and equitable sharing of the economic value of ecosystems and 
biodiversity, which encompasses benefits derived from the use of 
                                                                                                             
28 CBD, Decision Adopted by the COP XIII/16, Digital Sequence 
Information on Genetic Resources, at 1–2, U.N. Doc. CBD/COP/DEC/XIII/16 
(Dec. 16, 2016) (establishing an ad hoc technical expert group to examine any 
potential implications of the use of digital sequence information on genetic 
resources for the objectives of the Convention and the Protocol); Digital Sequence 
Information on Genetic Resources Public Meeting, 82 Fed. Reg. 28927 (June 26, 
2017) (calling for public comments in consideration for U.S. participation in 
future CBD and Nagoya Protocol meetings); see also Margo A. Bagley, Digital 
DNA: The Nagoya Protocol, Intellectual Property Treaties, and Synthetic 
Biology, WILSON CENTER: SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY PROJECT (Dec. 2015), 
http://www.synbioproject.org/publications/digital-dna-nagoya-protocol/. 
29 See, e.g., Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. 
Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013) (ruling that isolated DNA is not within the scope of patent 
eligible subject matter under the U.S. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 101); see also 
Convention on the Grant of European Patents [European Patent Convention 
(EPC)] art. 52 & EPC Implementing Regulations r. 27(a) (allowing biological 
material isolated from its natural environment or produced by means of a technical 
process as a patentable biotechnological invention). 
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genetic resources.30 
Economics play a role here in understanding the Nagoya 
Protocol’s underlying principle. The Protocol introduces an 
economic perspective to transnational genetic resources 
management by first recognizing public awareness of the economic 
value of ecosystems and biodiversity.31 It further recognizes that the 
fair and equitable sharing of this economic value with the custodians 
of biodiversity is a key incentive for the conservation of biological 
diversity and the sustainable use of its components.32  Under the 
CBD, custodians of biodiversity include sovereign states as well as 
indigenous and local communities. 
As far as the semantic relationship between the “ecosystem and 
biodiversity” and “genetic resources” is concerned, the former 
describes certain variable modes of the natural environment and its 
elements, 33  while the latter—despite the term not having been 
explicitly defined in the Protocol itself—ordinarily refers to tangible 
materials existing as integral components of a certain biological 
system with intrinsic value recognized at the molecular level.34 Of 
course, if digital DNA sequence data falls within the scope of 
“genetic resources,”35 then the term would cover not only tangible 
property, but also intangible information. 
On one hand, an ecosystem may exhibit inherent economic value 
                                                                                                             
30 CBD art. 1; Nagoya Protocol preamble (emphasis added). 
31 Nagoya Protocol preamble. 
32 Id. (emphasis added). 
33 CBD art. 2, paras. 1 & 8 (defining ecosystem as “a dynamic complex of 
plant, animal and micro-organism communities and their non-living environment 
interacting as a functional unit,” whereas defining biological diversity as “the 
variability among living organisms from all sources including, inter alia, 
terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological complexes of 
which they are part; this includes diversity within species, between species and of 
ecosystems”). 
34 See supra text accompanying notes 20–21; see also, e.g., Morten Walløe 
Tvedt & Peter Johan Schei, The Term ‘Genetic Resources’: Flexible and Dynamic 
While Providing Legal Certainty?, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF GENETIC 
RESOURCES: ACCESS AND BENEFIT SHARING AFTER THE NAGOYA PROTOCOL 18 
(Sebastian Oberthür & G. Kristin Rosendal eds., 2014) (illustrating rather 
inconsistent meanings of the term “genetic resources” as adopted by international 
organizations). 
35 See Bagley, supra note 28. 
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in the biosphere and provide measurable benefits to human beings. 
This concept is recognized today in the ecosystem services and 
natural capital contexts.36 On the other hand, scientific inquiries and 
sophisticated technology can enhance the economic value of genetic 
resources as property by deciphering genetic codes and their 
functions in the living system. It is unlikely that genetic resources as 
they exist in nature become automatically more valuable in 
economic terms by virtue of being harvested. In this regard, genetic 
resources are different from other kinds of natural resources, such 
as oil and gas. But there are similarities, too. For example, both are 
commonly viewed as non-ubiquitous, finite resources that should 
not be overexploited. Indeed, one could even argue that the 
traditional rule of capture or the labor theory of property would 
apply to genetic resources in determining property ownership, since 
those concepts apply to other migratory resources like oil and gas.37 
To attain the primary objective of the Nagoya Protocol and 
ultimately reach the overarching goals of the umbrella biodiversity 
treaty, baseline research and development activities utilizing genetic 
resources must increase. An increase would provide for the creation 
of new intellectual property and commodities, promote technology 
transfer and commercialization in industries, and establish cross-
border revenue streams in a fair and equitable manner under the 
Protocol’s grand scheme. 
But an increase would come with costs, as it requires both 
money and manpower to actively protect and conserve biodiversity 
in balance with other competing economic interests. Further, it is 
prohibitively more expensive to try to restore habitats once 
destroyed or lost. Therefore, to promote a sound and balanced 
economy, the Protocol urges prospectors of genetic resources to 
either pay the cost up front or to return a part of the profits, assets, 
and knowledge generated to source countries or communities in 
exchange for benefits arising from such genetic resources. The term 
Access and Benefit-Sharing (“ABS”) captures this concept. 
                                                                                                             
36 See Sharachchandra Lele, et al., Ecosystem Services: Origins, 
Contributions, Pitfalls, and Alternatives, 11 CONSERVATION & SOC. 343, 343–45 
(2013). 
37 See Jessica L. Roberts, Theories of Genetic Ownership, 38, 46 (Sept. 9, 
2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Petrie-Flom Center, Harvard 
Law School). 
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However, uncertainty remains as to whether new international rules 
governing the use of natural resources have sufficient legal force to 
mandate resource providers—who are mostly developing countries 
and indigenous communities—to return benefits to society by fully 
committing to sustainable development and local capacity building. 
For example, it is unclear whether resource providers are required 
to allocate a set amount of funding for regional habitat restoration 
efforts or for biotechnology specialists training.38 
 
E.  Challenges Posed by the Protocol 
 
As reaffirmed in its preamble, the Nagoya Protocol is grounded 
in the fundamental idea that each country should exercise its 
sovereign rights over its natural resources.39 This is a fundamental 
departure from the traditional view that biological resources on 
Earth are in the public domain and in should be freely available as 
global common goods. Yet in the property paradigm, countries 
enforcing their sovereign rights too strictly over biotic resources—
including forms of living organisms such as human pathogens and 
microorganisms found within its national territory—generate 
concerns that the Protocol’s scheme will eventually languish under 
the tragedy of the anticommons. The tragedy of the anticommons 
describes a legal environment where multiple owners are each 
endowed with the right to exclude others from a scarce resource, 
with no one person possessing an effective privilege of use.40 When 
there are too many owners holding rights of exclusion, the resource 
is prone to underuse. 41  On the contrary, lack of international 
coordination on the use of finite natural resources on the planet may 
                                                                                                             
38 Nagoya Protocol art. 22 (focusing capacity-building efforts on the least 
developed countries, small island developing states, and indigenous and local 
communities); id. art. 22, para. 5(h) (listing enhanced contribution of ABS 
activities to the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity as a capacity 
development measure); see also infra note 53. But see id. art. 9 (merely 
encouraging, but not requiring, directing benefits towards the biodiversity 
conservation). 
39 Nagoya Protocol preamble. 
40 Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the 
Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 623 (1998). 
41 Id. at 624. 
 
11
Kageyama: Bio-Property Contracts in a New Ecosystem: Genetic Resources Acce
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2018
120 WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS  [VOL. 
13:2 
lead to the tragedy of the commons, where the resources are prone 
to overuse.42 An example of this is found in marine biodiversity 
beyond national jurisdictions, where each country attempts to claim 
rights over resources on the high seas beyond any country’s 
exclusive economic zone.43 
In addition to concerns over resource underutilization, apparent 
regulatory complexities set by the Protocol can stifle innovations 
and sound competition in a manner contrary to the Protocol’s 
purposes of encouraging active use of genetic resources in the global 
bioeconomy. This means that unless it is properly administered, the 
treaty may have a chilling effect on bona fide international 
bioprospecting activities, and may even create a hostile environment 
for noncommercial biodiversity researchers.44 
Furthermore, depending on the degree of flexibility in enforcing 
the treaty provisions to realize fair and equitable transactions of 
genetic resources, the Protocol may have substantial implications on 
global health agenda, such as distribution of drugs, vaccines and 
antibiotics to developing countries. For example, in pre-Nagoya 
2007, Indonesia refused to share its clinical specimens of H5N1 
avian flu virus to the World Health Organization (“WHO”) in 
retaliation for the inequitable virus sharing practice in the global 
health sector that existed at the time.45 The Indonesian avian flu 
strain was supposed to be used for vaccine production by a private 
entity in Australia that planned to use this free virus sample to patent 
                                                                                                             
42 Id. 
43 See Development of an International Legally Binding Instrument Under 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the Conservation and 
Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas Beyond National 
Jurisdiction, G.A. Res. 69/292, U.N. Doc. A/RES/69/292 (June 19, 2015). 
44 See, e.g., Jörg Overmann & Amber Hartman Scholz, Microbiological 
Research Under the Nagoya Protocol: Facts and Fiction, 25 TRENDS IN 
MICROBIOLOGY 85 (2017) (arguing that non-commercial basic research will be 
negatively affected by restrictive policies under the Protocol). 
45 Endang R. Sedyaningsih et al., Towards Mutual Trust, Transparency and 
Equity in Virus Sharing Mechanism: The Avian Influenza Case of Indonesia, 37 
ANNALS ACAD. MED. SINGAPORE 482, 486 (2008); see also Marie Wilke, A 
Healthy Look at the Nagoya Protocol: Implications for Global Health 
Governance, THE 2010 NAGOYA PROTOCOL ON ACCESS AND BENEFIT-SHARING 
IN PERSPECTIVE: IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW AND IMPLEMENTATION 
CHALLENGE, at 123–24 (2013).  
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a vaccine, and sell the product back to Indonesia at an unaffordable 
price.46 This illustrates the frequent tension between stakeholders 
with competing interests over valuable biological property. As here, 
these are interests in securing access to human pathogens for public 
health purposes, protecting intellectual property for profits, and 
preventing valuable resources from being exploited by foreigners. 
The avian flu vaccine served as a great lesson for WHO, as WHO 
and CBD now work together closely to strengthen linkages between 
biodiversity and human health—particularly in the context of 
sharing pathogens and relevant clinical information during public 
health emergencies.47 
A pragmatic solution to overcome these various challenges 
would be to keep implementation mechanisms for the Nagoya 
Protocol simple, transparent, and flexible. A balance must be struck 
under this paradigm so that legitimate rights holders are adequately 
protected from unfair dealings, while for-profit bio-prospectors are 
still deterred from unjust enrichment. As analyzed in the later 
section on the Access and Benefit-Sharing Clearing-House, the 
high-level monitoring of ABS activities would probably be the best 
way for the Protocol to strike this balance. At the same time, the 
Protocol should allow provider-user negotiation at the ground level 
to maximize the Parties’ freedom of contract. Using the instrument’s 
terminology, as long as prior informed consent (“PIC”) can be 
secured, 48  mutually agreed terms (“MAT”) 49  between parties in  
private contracts are best left to negotiation to the extent permitted 
by the provider’s domestic laws. This approach will maximize the 
                                                                                                             
46 Sedyaningsih et al., supra note 45, at 486. 
47 World Health Organization [WHO], Review of the Pandemic Influenza 
Preparedness Framework: Collaboration with the Secretariat of the CBD and 
Other Relevant International Organizations, at 2, WHO Doc. A70/57 (May 4, 
2017) (recommending that the WHO flu preparedness framework be recognized 
as a specialized international ABS instrument under the Protocol and that CBD 
share with WHO information regarding the ABS implementation on health 
emergency cases through a national reporting system under Nagoya Protocol arts. 
4(4) & 8(b) & 29); see also Daniel Cressey, Treaty to Stop Biopiracy Threatens 
to Delay Flu Vaccines, 542 NATURE 148 (2017) (highlighting WHO’s direction 
to integrate a benefit-sharing mechanism into the global vaccine supply system to 
expedite seasonal flu vaccine production). 
48 Nagoya Protocol art. 6. 
49 Id. art. 5. 
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positive effects of freedom of contract while promoting access to 
untapped genetic resources found within the territory of each 
provider country. 
 
F.  Nagoya Protocol and Intellectual Property 
 
Although the subject matter of the Nagoya Protocol is primarily 
biological, its reach is not limited to environmental and natural 
resources laws as implied by the parent treaty’s title, Convention on 
Biological Diversity, implies. As demonstrated by the example of 
the Indonesian avian flu virus, the Protocol frequently implicates 
law regarding technology and intellectual property. Technology 
transfer is an important part of the Protocol’s objective, as the 
Protocol purports to contribute to sustainable development by 
building research and innovation capacities in developing 
economies, and adding value to genetic resources.50 Each Party to 
the Protocol is required to take necessary legislative, administrative 
or policy measures as appropriate to establish clear rules and 
procedures for mandating and establishing MAT, including benefit-
sharing clauses that address relevant intellectual property rights.51 
This means that under the Nagoya framework, intellectual property 
rights are presumed to be among a “bundle of rights” to be 
considered up front in bilateral negotiations between providers and 
users of genetic resources, and memorialized in a written contract 
called a material transfer agreement. 
Developing MAT over intellectual property rights, or other 
forms of benefits expected from the use of genetic resources, is 
similar to drafting a standard technology licensing agreement. This 
is especially true if benefit-sharing can be unambiguously written in 
financial terms, such as royalties. 52  However, MAT established 
under Nagoya are still distinguishable from terms of a technology 
license in some critical respects. First, although individually 
negotiated and agreed-upon terms are flexible to a certain extent, 
they must conform with the domestic laws of the provider country 
implementing the treaty. The Protocol is designed so that specific 
measures to implement its ABS scheme are largely left to the 
                                                                                                             
50 Id. preamble. 
51 Id. art. 6.3(g)(ii). 
52 Id. annex 1(d). 
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prerogative of each Party. Unless the provider country explicitly 
disclaims its rights to genetic resources leaving its jurisdiction as a 
matter of public policy, the provider country’s laws may have an 
extraterritorial reach over all contracting parties, and may even 
override a contradictory MAT. This could interfere severely with 
the Parties’ freedom of contract. 
Another idiosyncratic aspect of an ABS material transfer 
agreement is that intellectual property may not have been fully 
developed, or vested, at the time the Parties entered into an 
executory agreement. Original source organisms or isolated 
biochemical compounds themselves are merely raw materials of 
limited commercial value. They are tangible and exhaustible 
personal property. But intellectual property assets, once successfully 
developed out of such exhaustible resources of intrinsic value, 
become significantly more economically valuable. Moreover, 
intellectual property is inexhaustible and can be shared with others 
without diminishing its value. Quid pro quo in this context dictates 
granting relevant intellectual property rights or other forms of 
economic benefits to the source country in return for gaining access 
to its original raw ingredients. Regarding benefits, the Protocol 
assumes a broad range of beneficial arrangements as acceptable 
forms of benefits that can be exchanged under the ABS scheme. For 
reference, a non-exhaustive list of different types of benefits, both 
monetary and non-monetary, is found in the Annex to the Protocol.53 
Compared to standard technology licensing, parties may have to 
allow material transfer agreements to contain indefinite language 
where intellectual property has yet to be developed. This requires 
parties to initially assume higher risk under the ABS framework, 
even though they may be able to reassess, and modify original terms 
after they execute an original agreement. From the industries’ 
perspectives, it may take years for companies to develop patentable 
products such as pharmaceuticals. In such circumstances, the party 
requesting access would likely favor a risk-averse approach, such as 
                                                                                                             
53 Id. annex (listing plausible types of non-monetary benefits, inter alia, 
sharing of results and collaboration in research programs; participation in product 
development; admittance to ex situ facilities and databases; education and 
training; transfer of knowledge and technology; capacity-building; food and 
livelihood security benefits; social recognition; and joint ownership of intellectual 
property rights). 
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first conducting preliminary testing, and evaluating target materials 
before expanding the project to a full industrial scale to lower the 
risk of breaching any MATs. 
In recent decades, traditional knowledge is a type of community-
owned intellectual property right recognized not only by the CBD 
and Nagoya Protocol, but also by the international intellectual 
property sector. 54  As discussed earlier, the term “traditional 
knowledge” is not defined within the Protocol or the Convention. 
However, the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) 
defines traditional knowledge as a living body of knowledge passed 
on from generation to generation within a community that often 
forms part of a people’s cultural and spiritual identity.55 The CBD 
Working Group has intensively reviewed the term and concept of 
traditional knowledge since the 2000s. 56  Referred to as Article 
8(j),57 the current proposed definition of traditional knowledge is: 
the knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local 
communities embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for the 
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity. 58  It is 
generally understood that traditional knowledge has greatly 
contributed to the discovery, creation, and preservation of valuable 
community knowledge related to medicinal, therapeutic, and other 
beneficial use of certain biological resources. However, dealing with 
traditional knowledge in the context of a material transfer and 
technology licensing agreement poses novel challenges for most 
stakeholders. 
                                                                                                             
54 See generally U.N. DEP’T OF INT’L ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, STATE OF THE 
WORLD’S INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, at 74, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/328, U.N. Sales No. 
09.VI.13 (2009) (reviewing the history of indigenous peoples in light of 
intellectual property rights, with emphasis on how the international property rights 
regime has failed to recognize indigenous customary law). 
55 World Intell. Prop. Org. [hereinafter WIPO], Traditional Knowledge, 
http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2018). 
56 CBD Executive Secretary, Glossary of Relevant Key Terms and Concepts 
Within the Context of Article 8(j) and Related Provisions, U.N. Doc. 
CBD/WG8J/10/3 (Sept. 10, 2017). 
57 CBD art. 8(j) (“[P]romote . . . wider application [of traditional knowledge] 
with the approval and involvement of the holders of such knowledge . . . and 
encourage the equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the utilization of such 
knowledge.”). 
58 CBD Executive Secretary, supra note 56, annex. 
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Because added value of genetic resources partly comes from its 
essential attribution to a particular species or variety that originated 
in a specific locality, geographical indication is presumed to be 
another type of an intellectual property right to be accounted for in 
benefit-sharing negotiation, despite absence of the term in the 
Protocol text. Basically, provider countries would like to protect and 
control geographical indications over new innovative products that 
are developed in exchange for genetic resources uniquely sourced 
from their respective territories. The geographical origin of products 
has likewise been contemplated in the international trade context. In 
particular, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (“TRIPS Agreement”) has a whole section 
dedicated to geographical indications, with special reference to 
wines and spirits. 59  “Geographical indications” are defined as 
indications that identify a good as originating in the territory of a 
member state, or a region or locality in that territory, where a given 
quality, reputation, or other characteristic of the good is essentially 
attributable to its geographical origin.60 
Finally, as far as patent law is concerned, a great deal of 
unknowns exist in current national policies among the member 
states as to whether, when a claimed invention is based upon genetic 
materials sourced from another jurisdiction bound by the Protocol, 
domestic patent law requires applicants to comply with the Nagoya 
Protocol as a prerequisite for granting a biotechnology patent. For 
instance, domestic legislation could create new obligations for a 
patent applicant to submit an official permit or certificate of 
compliance to the national patent office.61 Or the national patent 
                                                                                                             
59 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights § 3, 
arts. 22–24, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 308 [hereinafter TRIPS 
Agreement]. 
60 TRIPS Agreement, supra, art. 22, ¶ 1. 
61 See Draft Decision to Enhance Mutual Supportiveness Between the TRIPS 
Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity, Communication from 
Brazil, China, Colombia, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Peru, Thailand, the ACP 
Group, and the African Group, at 2, WTO Doc. TN/C/W/59 (Apr. 19, 2011) 
(proposing an amendment to the TRIPS Agreement by inserting Article 29bis, 
which requires that patent applicants provide a copy of an Internationally 
Recognized Certificate of Compliance with the Nagoya Protocol, infra text 
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office could require applicants to disclose the country of origin of 
foreign genetic materials that led to a claimed invention in a patent 
publication. 62  Such mandatory disclosure in published patent 
applications would put countries and communities on notice, and 
may allow them to challenge patentability in a timely manner.63 Of 
course, these public parties must show standing as holders of 
property rights or traditional knowledge in interest, as well as a valid 
claim under the applicable law of any given jurisdiction. Relatedly, 
a domestic law, either by statute or case law, may enable the court 
to invalidate a patent or render it unenforceable if the alleged 
infringer can show that the patent-in-suit was derived from genetic 
resources that were unlawfully acquired in noncompliance with a 
provider country’s laws implementing the Protocol.64  
                                                                                                             
accompanying notes 87–90) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement Article 29bis]. 
62 See, e.g., Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhuan Li Fa (中华人民共和国
专利法) [Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 12, 1984, last rev’d Dec. 27, 2008, 
effective Oct. 1, 2009), art. 5, para. 2 (“Patent rights shall not be granted for 
inventions that are accomplished by relying on genetic resources which are 
obtained or used in violation of the provisions of laws and administrative 
regulations.”); id. art. 26, para. 5 (“With regard to an invention-creation 
accomplished by relying on genetic resources, the applicant shall, in the patent 
application documents, indicate the direct and original source of the genetic 
resources. If the applicant cannot indicate the original source, he shall state the 
reasons.”), 
http://english.sipo.gov.cn/laws/lawsregulations/201101/t20110119_566244.html
; but see, e.g., Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 6 July 1998 on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions, recital 27, 
1998 O.J. (L 213) 13, 15 (EC) (“[I]f an invention is based on biological material 
of plant or animal origin or if it uses such material, the patent application should, 
where appropriate, include information on the geographical origin of such 
material, if known; whereas this is without prejudice to the processing of patent 
applications or the validity of rights arising from granted patents”); see generally 
WIPO, DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS TABLE (Oct. 2017), 
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/tk/en/documents/pdf/genetic_resources_d
isclosure.pdf (providing a non-exhaustive list of disclosure requirements related 
to genetic resources or traditional knowledge in thirty-three jurisdictions). 
63 See Wallace Feng, Appropriation Without Benefit-Sharing: Origin-of-
Resource Disclosure Requirements and Enforcement Under TRIPS and the 
Nagoya Protocol, 18 CHI. J. INT’L L. 245, 249 (2017). 
64 See TRIPS Agreement Article 29bis, supra note 61, at 3 (providing under 
Article 29bis, paragraph 5, that if relevant national legislation of a provider 
 
18
Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts, Vol. 13, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta/vol13/iss2/2
2018] ACCESS AND BENEFIT SHARING 127 
 
II. ACCESS AND BENEFIT-SHARING CLEARING-HOUSE 
 
The Access and Benefit-Sharing Clearing-House is a public 
website administered by the CBD Secretariat.65 It is designed to 
serve as a one-stop shop for obtaining comprehensive information 
about the ABS-related activities, such as a list of countries bound by 
the Nagoya Protocol, each country’s point of contact, the status of 
national legislation, and policy documents.66 It also provides web 
links to general administrative information released by the 
Secretariat, such as minutes and decisions of Conferences of the 
Parties. 67  Not only government officials, but also innovation 
business owners, corporate counsel, scientists, technology transfer 
practitioners at universities, and non-governmental organizations, 
should be cognizant of what is available on the ABS Clearing-House 
by visiting the site as often as necessary to obtain the latest 
information. The site should be particularly useful for keeping those 
working on projects involving bioscience or biotechnology 
informed about how this evolving regime may directly affect their 
activities. The following sections provide important points for these 
individuals to contemplate before further exploring ABS 
opportunities, as well as general guidance on where to locate 
relevant information within the ABS Clearing-House.  
 
A.  Two Perspectives of a Party 
 
When reviewing the Nagoya Protocol’s Access and Benefit-
Sharing framework through the ABS Clearing-House, it is important 
to consider that being a Party to the Protocol as a sovereign state 
                                                                                                             
country is violated, the country may impose sanctions, including revocation of the 
patent). In the United States, even if misappropriation of genetic resources 
constitutes a violation of a foreign national law, it is unlikely to give rise to 
unenforceability of a U.S. patent for inequitable conduct without a finding of but-
for materiality of withheld information to patentability; see Therasense, Inc. v. 
Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
65 Nagoya Protocol art. 14. 
66 ABSCH, supra note 12, https://absch.cbd.int/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2018). 
67 ABSCH, CBD Secretariat [hereinafter SCBD] Records, Meetings, 
https://absch.cbd.int/search/scbdRecords?schema=meeting (last visited Mar. 1, 
2018). 
19
Kageyama: Bio-Property Contracts in a New Ecosystem: Genetic Resources Acce
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2018
128 WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS  [VOL. 
13:2 
means being bound by two sets of reciprocal rules in multilateral 
transactions of genetic resources: rights and obligations of a 
provider, and rights and obligations of a user. To illustrate this, 
Figure 1 exhibits a simplified interrelationship between Parties 
under the Nagoya Protocol framework. This article discusses the 
Access and Benefit-Sharing principle primarily with United States 
users in mind. However, it is important to keep providers’ interests 
in mind to achieve one’s intended business objectives without 
risking encroaching on others’ interests. 
At the national level, each Party is responsible for implementing 
its commitment to the treaty through domestic legislation, 
regulations, and administrative and policy measures.68 Subject to 
these domestic laws, a Party exercises state sovereignty over genetic 
resources as both a provider country and user country with 
associated rights and obligations. The Party’s designated authority, 
called Competent National Authority, reviews individual access 
requests containing provisions in the MAT.69 The authority may 
encourage benefit-sharing terms so that upon alienation of genetic 
resources, the Party may retain a right to claim a share in benefits 
from foreign users.70 Within the exercise of sovereign rights, the 
Competent National Authority makes a final determination whether 
to deny or approve such an access request, and issues a permit or 
equivalent written evidence certifying that the access requirements 
have been met.71 Through these administrative processes, the Party 
formally grants PIC for taking genetic resources for use overseas. In 
theory, without such government-issued permits, biological 
materials are not allowed to be exported from a source country. 
On the receiving end, as soon as genetic materials of foreign 
origin are brought into its jurisdiction by users’ request, the Party is 
obligated to coordinate with the Secretariat to monitor the domestic 
                                                                                                             
68 Nagoya Protocol art. 5 (benefit sharing); art. 6, para. 3 (access); arts. 15–
16 (compliance). 
69 Id. art. 13. 
70 See id. art. 13, para. 2 (“Competent national authorities shall . . . be 
responsible for advising on applicable . . . requirements for obtaining [PIC] and 
entering into [MAT].”). 
71 Id. (“Competent national authorities shall . . . be responsible for granting 
access or, as applicable, issuing written evidence that access requirements have 
been met”). 
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activities of the people and entities participating in the system as 
individual resource users.72 The monitoring is done by designated 
in-country Checkpoints to enhance transparency regarding the use 
of genetic resources after permits are granted.73 The Party also has 
a duty to report these ABS-related events through the Clearing-
House.74 Unsurprisingly, any given Party may be involved in the 
treaty predominantly as a resource user, a resource provider, or both. 
Presumably, countries and indigenous communities embracing 
biodiversity hotspots,75 areas particularly rich in endemic plant and 
animal species, tend to have greater economic interests at stake as a 
provider than a user. 
In accordance with domestic legislation, negotiation over MAT 
may happen directly between the individual user, and the provider 
country represented by the Competent National Authority or 
National Focal Points in some cases.76 However, depending on the 
individual circumstances, the MAT and PIC negotiation process 
may also involve private rights owners. Rights owners in this 
context include private property owners that grant direct access to 
genetic resources as they are requested. In addition, indigenous or 
local community representatives holding traditional knowledge 
associated with genetic resources may also be involved. To 
complicate the whole picture further, another category of parties in 
interest may be actively involved in this legal ecosystem as well. 
Examples are ex situ biorepositories, such as non-human gene banks 
and culture collections, where organisms of different geographic 
origins are stored in centralized facilities abroad. Stockpiled genetic 
resources like these are generally publicly available to legitimate 
                                                                                                             
72 Nagoya Protocol arts. 17, 29; see also id. art. 15, para. 2 & art. 16, para. 2 
(requiring that each user country take appropriate, effective, and proportionate 
measures to address situations of non-compliance with adopted measures). 
73 Id. art. 17, para. 1. 
74 See id. art. 14, para. 2 & art. 17, para. 1(a)(iii) (providing that sharing 
information on ABSCH is without prejudice to the protection of confidential 
information). 
75 Cf. Russell A. Mittermeier et al., Global Biodiversity Conservation: The 
Critical Role of Hotspots, BIODIVERSITY HOTSPOTS 3 (2011). 
76 Id. art. 13; id. preamble (“[R]ecognizing the importance of promoting 
equity and fairness in negotiation of [MAT] between providers and users of 
genetic resources.”). 
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researchers upon access request, such as the National Museum of 
Natural History in the Smithsonian Institution. 77  Indeed, 
noncommercial researchers worldwide have heavily relied on these 
authentic third-party biological collections, even though existing 
biorepositories would not completely substitute scientists’ need for 
acquiring specimens of particular groups of organisms from in situ 
sources, such as their native habitats.78 These additional players are 
not represented in Figure 1, but the situation would likely create a 
legal relationship similar to a trusteeship, guardianship, 
custodianship, or stewardship.79 
 
B.  Information Available at the Clearing-House 
 
The Access and Benefit-Sharing Clearing-House’s web 
interface has gone through extensive overhaul and redesigning to 
improve user-friendliness.80  Publicly available data stored in the 
database has grown rapidly in recent years.81 Most of the records 
                                                                                                             
77 See OFF. OF DIR., NAT’L MUSEUM OF NAT. HISTORY, SMITHSONIAN INST., 
ACCESS AND BENEFIT SHARING POLICY ON GENETIC RESOURCES (effective June 
23, 2012) (expressing the full institutional commitment to the CBD and related 
international instruments, including requesting PIC and MAT before the 
collection or transport of genetic resources.). 
78 See Myrna E. Watanabe, The Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit 
Sharing: International Treaty Poses Challenges for Biological Collections, 65 
BIOSCIENCE 543 (2015) (highlighting perspectives of noncommercial researchers 
concerning how the Nagoya Protocol may affect their collection-based work.); 
see also D. Neumann et al., Global Biodiversity Research Tied Up by Juridical 
Interpretations of Access and Benefit Sharing, ORGANISMS DIVERSITY & 
EVOLUTION 1, 4 (Nov. 27, 2017), https://doi.org/10.1007/s13127-017-0347-1 
(asserting that simplified measures should be created specifically for 
noncommercial research as provided under the Protocol’s article 8(a).). 
79 Peter H. Sand, Sovereignty Bounded: Public Trusteeship for Common Pool 
Resources?, 4 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL’YS 47, 52 (2004). An alternative 
interpretation applicable to new acquisitions of genetic resources is that a 
jurisdiction in which a public biorepository resides becomes a provider country 
on a parity with the country of origin of such resources, as long as that repository 
country has acquired the genetic resources in accordance with the Protocol and 
the CBD. See Nagoya Protocol art. 5, para. 1; art. 6, para 1. 
80 ABSCH, supra note 12. 
81 As of the ABSCH’s official launch date Oct. 12, 2014, the database under 
ABS Measures was populated with 26 national records from three jurisdictions; 
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posted are available with direct web links or for free download in 
.pdf format. The search engine allows site users to run a query based 
on specific key words, or to narrow data to a specific country. 
However, navigating through the Clearing-House is still far from 
intuitive for first-time users, and takes practice to efficiently locate 
and retrieve required information. Information at the ABS Clearing-
House is organized into three main categories: (1) national records, 
(2) reference records, and (3) records managed by the Secretariat.82 
 
1. National Records 
 
National records are published by participating governments and 
include national information relevant to the implementation of the 
Nagoya Protocol, as well as information Parties are obliged to 
provide in accordance with the Protocol. Types of records indexed 
under this section include: ABS National Focal Points; Competent 
National Authorities; ABS Measures; National Websites and 
Databases; Internationally Recognized Certificates of Compliance; 
Checkpoints; Checkpoint Communiqués; and Interim National 
Reports.83  
Because non-Parties are encouraged to contribute appropriate 
information to the ABS Clearing-House, even the United States has 
an entry in the database with its minimum country profile. 84 
Furthermore, though as many as ninety-four countries are currently 
listed as non-Parties to the Protocol, that does not necessarily mean 
that those countries lack relevant domestic legislation. For instance, 
Brazil is not yet a Party, but it has recently enacted a federal law 
providing for its own ABS framework that has a similar effect when 
combined with a user registration system.85 By filtering and sorting 
                                                                                                             
by the end of 2015, 31 records from five jurisdictions; by the end of 2016, 153 
records from 45 jurisdictions; and by the end of 2017, 284 records from 63 
jurisdictions. ABSCH, ABS Measures, 
https://absch.cbd.int/search/nationalRecords?schema=measure (last visited Mar. 
1, 2018). 
82 ABSCH, supra note 12. 
83 ABSCH, National Records, https://absch.cbd.int (last visited Mar. 1, 
2018). 
84 Nagoya Protocol art. 24. 
85 Lei No. 13.123, de 20 de Maio de 2015, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO 
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the database, the ABS Clearing-House provides an entry point for 
obscure information pertaining to Brazil and other non-Parties.86 
It is noteworthy that the Secretariat is the only authority to issue 
an Internationally Recognized Certificate of Compliance based on a 
national permit granted and other related information submitted by 
the Competent National Authority of a provider country concerning 
an individual access request.87 Certificates of Compliance serve as 
evidence of the authority’s decision to grant PIC and of the 
establishment of MAT.88 Certificates of Compliance are published 
on the ABS Clearing-House under the National Records section.89 
These Certificates may disclose additional detail about PIC and 
MAT as well as specific subject matter covered, whether 
commercial use is allowed by the permit, and conditions for third-
party transfer of genetic resources and associated intellectual 
property rights.90 Although analysis of individual ABS projects is 
beyond the scope of this article, information disclosed in Certificates 
of Compliance should be highly relevant to other stakeholders as 
existing model cases. 
 
2. Reference Records 
 
Reference records include resources and information 
                                                                                                             
[D.O.U.] de 21.5.2015 (Braz.), http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2015-
2018/2015/Lei/L13123.htm; Decreto No. 8.772, de 11 de Maio de 2016, D.O.U. 
de 12.5.2016 (Braz.); SISGEN: SISTEMA NACIONAL DE GESTÃO DO PATRIMÔNIO 
GENÉTICO E DO CONHECIMENTO TRADICIONAL ASSOCIADO [National System for 
the Management of Genetic Heritage and Associated Traditional Knowledge], 
https://sisgen.gov.br (Braz.).  
86 See, e.g., ABSCH, Brazil– Country Profile, 
https://absch.cbd.int/countries/BR (last visited Mar. 1, 2018). 
87 Id. art. 6, para. 3(e). 
88 Id. art. 17, para. 3. 
89 Id. art. 17, para 2; ABSCH, Internationally Recognized Certificates of 
Compliance, https://absch.cbd.int/search/nationalRecords?schema=absPermit 
(listing over 140 Certificates of Compliance that have been issued based on twelve 
provider countries so far, including Belarus, Bulgaria, Dominican Republic, 
Guatemala, India, Kenya, Malta, Mexico, Panama, Peru, South Africa, and Spain, 
among which India has processed the largest number of requests that have led to 
eighty-six Certificates) (last visited Mar. 1, 2018). 
90 Nagoya Protocol art. 17, para. 4. 
 
24
Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts, Vol. 13, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta/vol13/iss2/2
2018] ACCESS AND BENEFIT SHARING 133 
immediately relevant to Access and Benefit-Sharing stakeholders. 
They can be submitted by any registered user of the ABS Clearing-
House, including Parties, non-Parties, governments, international 
organizations, indigenous and local communities, and other key 
stakeholders. Types of records found under this section are: Virtual 
Library Records; Capacity-building Initiatives; Model Contractual 
Clauses, Codes of Conduct, Guidelines, Best Practices and/or 
Standards; and Community protocols and procedures and customary 
laws.91 Among these, model clauses, guidelines, best practices and 
standards seem immediately helpful.92 
 
3. Secretariat Managed Records 
 
The CBD Secretariat (“SCBD”) regularly publishes official 
information under this section, including meetings, news stories, 
notifications, and formal statements. These are classified into: 
What’s New; Notifications; Meetings; and News within this 
section.93 
 
III. ACCESS AND BENEFIT-SHARING IN ACTION 
 
A.  Implementation and Enforcement 
 
The new multilateral legal landscape that has loomed for the last 
several years under the ABS framework is still in flux. As of 2018, 
a majority of Parties have been actively working on establishing 
national programs and building domestic capacity to become fully 
compliant with the treaty provisions, but there is still considerable 
                                                                                                             
91 ABSCH, Reference Records, https://absch.cbd.int (last visited Mar. 1, 
2018). 
92 ABSCH, Reference Records, Model Contractual Clauses, Codes of 
Conduct, Guidelines, Best Practices and/or Standards, 
https://absch.cbd.int/search/referenceRecords?schema=modelContractualClause 
(last visited Mar. 1, 2018) (listing twenty-eight publications including those from 
industries, for example, the Biotechnology Innovation Organization in the U.S. 
and the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and 
Associations based in Switzerland.). 
93 ABSCH, SCBD Records, https://absch.cbd.int (last visited Mar. 1, 2018). 
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work to be done. 94  For example, as of April 2018, Competent 
National Authorities have been designated and reported to the ABS 
Clearing-House from fewer than half of the 105 Parties.95 Likewise, 
legislative, administrative, and policy measures have been published 
by only about half of the Parties.96 Moreover, these country-level 
implementing measures have not been cross-checked, let alone 
harmonized. 
Legal unpredictability also remains high with respect to the 
Protocol’s cross-jurisdictional enforcement mechanisms. As the 
Protocol’s Article 18 stipulates, each Party is deemed to make 
efforts to promote mutual recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments and arbitral awards through international dispute 
resolution mechanisms,97 which is in line with the comity of nations 
doctrine.98 The Protocol at least provides for access to justice by 
means of an opportunity to seek recourse in cases of disputes arising 
from MAT. 99  The treaty encourages MAT to include a dispute 
                                                                                                             
94 See, e.g., Iden shigen no shutoku no kikai oyobi sono riyō kara shōzuru 
rieki no kōsei katsu syōhei na haibun ni kansuru shishin [ABS shishin] 
[Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing 
of Benefits Arising from their Utilization] (May 18, 2017), 
http://www.env.go.jp/nature/biodic-abs/pdf_04/4-1.pdf (Japan). Japan has been a 
signatory to the Protocol since May 2011, but it took the country six years to 
become a Party by establishing ABS Guidelines—domestic implementing 
measures—which came into force on August 20, 2017. See MINISTRY OF THE 
ENV’T, GOV’T OF JAPAN, ABS GUIDELINES: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NAGOYA 
PROTOCOL IN JAPAN (July 2017), http://www.env.go.jp/nature/biodic-
abs/pdf/pamphlet_en.pdf. 
95 ABSCH, https://absch.cbd.int/countries/status/party (displaying 45 out of 
105 Parties in total as those having at least one Competent National Authority 
designated, among which Mexico designates as many as six Competent National 
Authorities) (last visited Mar. 1, 2018). 
96 Id. (displaying 45 out of 105 Parties as those having at least one legislative, 
administrative, or policy measure published, among which India has as many as 
thirty implementing measures published) (last visited Mar. 1, 2018). 
97 Nagoya Protocol art. 18, para. 3(b). See also id. art. 15, para. 3 & art. 16, 
para. 3 (requiring that parties cooperate in cases of alleged violation of domestic 
ABS legislation or regulatory requirements as far as possible and as appropriate). 
98 See William S. Dodge, International Comity in American Law, 115 COLUM. 
L. REV. 2071 (2015) (classifying recognition of foreign judgments as 
“adjudicative comity” within the international comity doctrine.). 
99 Nagoya Protocol art. 18, para. 2. 
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settlement clause that prescribes the jurisdiction to which providers 
and users will subject any matters of dispute, the applicable law, and 
options for alternative dispute resolution. 100  On top of that, the 
dispute settlement provision under the Convention also applies to 
the Protocol, which provides that if negotiation or third-party 
mediation does not resolve a dispute, parties must bring a case 
before an international arbitral tribunal or the International Court of 
Justice (“ICJ”) as a means of dispute settlement.101 However, an 
individual or a private entity cannot be a party to ICJ proceedings, 
nor are ICJ judgments automatically enforceable as domestic law in 
national courts.102  
Pursuant to Article 31 of the Protocol, the Conference of the 
Parties is going to undertake an evaluation of the effectiveness of 
the Protocol including both its implementation and enforcement 
mechanisms for the first time on October 12, 2018, four years after 
entering into force.103 This assessment must be a critical checkpoint 
for assuring continued development of the Protocol as an effective 
legal instrument to further its goal of equitable benefit sharing 
between users and providers of genetic resources. 
Moreover, for a number of years international organizations 
such as WHO and WIPO, as well as the World Trade Organization 
(“WTO”) and other intergovernmental bodies with overlapping 
global agendas, have recognized some gaps or incongruence in the 
CBD and Nagoya Protocol with other legal instruments in several 
key aspects. Nevertheless, the process of reconciliation has thus far 
been slow.104  
                                                                                                             
100 Id. arts. 6, para. 3(g)(i) & art. 18, para 1; see also WIPO, WIPO 
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) for Biodiversity, 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/center/specific-sectors/biodiversity/ (last visited 
Mar. 1, 2018) (“Biodiversity disputes can concern a wide range of highly specific 
subject matters relating . . . to patents, genetic resources, traditional knowledge, 
plant varieties, environment, and food. They . . . can also involve sensitive non-
legal components of a commercial, cultural, ethical, or moral nature.”). 
101 CBD art. 27, para. 3(b) & 5. 
102 Statute of the International Court of Justice [ICJ] art. 34, ¶ 1, June 26, 
1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993 (“Only states may be parties in cases before the 
[ICJ].”); Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 511 (2008). 
103 Nagoya Protocol arts. 18, para. 4 & 31. 
104 See supra notes 47, 55, 59, 61. See also, e.g., Matrix on Trade-Related 
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Aside from large-scale initiatives leveraged at the governmental 
and intergovernmental levels supporting this dynamic legal 
ecosystem, the question of whether the Nagoya Protocol can 
continue to operate effectively and sustainably in the future comes 
down to individual users’ due diligence as primary contracting 
parties of ABS agreements. In other words, the whole legal 
ecosystem would hardly function without positive participation and 
cooperation of individual users complying with established 
procedures and MAT under the rule of law. Contract disputes will 
inevitably arise from MAT. Because of the significantly contractual 
basis of how the treaty is going to be implemented, as explained 
above, appropriate conflict resolution rules must be established to 
govern conflict of laws in cross-border contract disputes involving 
genetic resources. International rules for construing bio-property 
contracts under the Nagoya Protocol are urgently needed to improve 
predictability of this instrument’s enforceability. 
 
B.  Implications for United States Stakeholders 
 
The United States’ status as a non-Party to the Nagoya Protocol 
notwithstanding, it is in the best interest of Americans to keep the 
door open to opportunities for exploring untapped genetic resources 
located outside the U.S boundaries, as firms and institutions benefit 
from continued engagement in joint enterprises with global partners 
from member states. These countries include economically 
important jurisdictions like the European Union, Mexico, China, 
India, and South Africa.105 In these scenarios, it would be unwise to 
steer clear of international research and development opportunities 
in fear of stepping into the unknown realm of the Nagoya Protocol. 
However, once bound by the ABS scheme, it is difficult to imagine 
that any government authority would grant special exceptions or 
privileges to American users merely on the ground that the U.S. is a 
                                                                                                             
Measures Pursuant to Selected Multilateral Environmental Agreements, Note by 
the Secretariat (Revision), at 77, WTO Doc. WT/CTE/W/160/Rev.8 (Oct. 9, 
2017) (providing a comprehensive list of topics previously addressed by the 
Conference of the Parties to CBD relating to international trade and the work of 
WTO, including the TRIPS Agreement). 
105 See ABSCH, supra note 12. 
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non-Party to the Protocol. As the Protocol Article 24 sets forth, 
Parties must encourage non-Parties to adhere to the Protocol.106 
More broadly, any attempt to import biological materials into 
the United States without proper documentation, including a formal 
permit issued by a provider country’s government, might invoke 
U.S. domestic laws like the Lacey Act.107 The Lacey Act can hold a 
party liable for transporting species taken illegally in violation of a 
foreign law, although its enforceability in the ABS context is 
unknown.108 Therefore, even on a voluntary basis, one should defer 
to the international regulatory framework and abide by MAT as the 
best course of action. This recommendation is valid even with the 
U.S. government’s current status as a non-Party to the Convention—
an outlier in the United Nations community for unrelated political 
or diplomatic reasons. 
From a more practical standpoint, it would be prudent for U.S. 
stakeholders, or potential users in any other jurisdictions that are 
non-Parties, for that matter, to first identify and collaborate with 
their foreign counterparts and legal counsel licensed in their 
respective jurisdictions. Realistically, this would be the only way 
American stakeholders can make an informed decision beyond just 
obtaining baseline knowledge through the ABS Clearing-House, 
because unlike the treaty member states, the U.S. federal 
government currently lacks an office, website, and budget formally 
dedicated to providing services on ABS-related matters for 
American general public.109  In contrast, stakeholders in member 
states should have more direct access to relevant information 
resources as well as the country’s administrative departments that 
serve as National Focal Points or Checkpoints for their citizens. 
                                                                                                             
106 Nagoya Protocol art. 24. 
107 Lacey Act Amendments of 1981, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371–3378 (2012). 
108 Id. § 3372 (making it unlawful for any person to import in foreign 
commerce any fish, wildlife, or plant, whether live or dead, including parts taken, 
possessed, transported, or sold in violation of foreign laws.). 
109 But see CBD, United States of America – Country Profile, 
https://www.cbd.int/countries/nfp/default.shtml?country=us (listing U.S. 
Department of State and other federal government agencies’ representatives as 
National Focal Points) (last visited Mar. 1, 2018); see also Digital Sequence 
Information on Genetic Resources Public Meeting, 82 Fed. Reg. 28927 (June 26, 
2017) (indicating the U.S. Department of State as the agency point of contact for 
a CBD-related public hearing in the U.S.). 
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They should be able to tell the current status of domestic 
implementing measures and guide you through necessary 
application procedures. Until the international standard and best 
practices are sufficiently established, each provider country will 
continue to be responsible for educating potential users of legal 
procedures and paperwork required to meet specific ABS 
requirements. The need for such foresight is obvious, given that 
provider countries are the ones in the best position to expound their 
own domestic statutes, rules, court decisions, and policies. 
Meanwhile, relevant industries that are likely subject to the Nagoya 
Protocol regulations in their primary activities should seriously 
address the compliance issue in their risk assessment in relation to 
international project management, technology transfer, and global 
intellectual property rights management. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Once the Nagoya Protocol becomes fully operational as a 
globally recognized system in the next few years, there should be 
increased transparency, consistency, and accountability for 
transactions of genetic resources among all players. Although the 
United States is neither a signatory to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity nor the Nagoya Protocol, American stakeholders are not 
free to disregard these international rules. Because the principal 
mechanism of implementing the Nagoya Protocol has a contractual 
basis characterized by the Prior Informed Consent and Mutually 
Agreed Terms, U.S. stakeholders who are going to enter into an 
agreement under the Access and Benefit-Sharing scheme should 
defer to this new international regulatory framework. Participants 
should acknowledge the Mutually Agreed Terms incorporating 
foreign domestic laws of a Party laid down to effectuate fair dealing 
in biological materials across jurisdictions. 
The long-term success of the Nagoya Protocol depends on 
individual users’ due diligence and compliance with the new global 
standard of utilizing genetic resources in a fair and equitable 
manner. However, too much formality in procedures or 
extraterritorial restrictive control by governments may function as a 
strong disincentive to timely and efficient access to genetic 
materials and may have a chilling effect on bona fide biodiversity 
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research and bioprospecting activities that could lead to discoveries 
of next-generation cancer therapies or biotechnological 
breakthroughs. Nevertheless, it is in the interest of everyone 
involved in bio-property transactions to comply with local rules 
regardless of whether one’s home country is a signatory. While the 
regulatory landscape is still in flux, an initial comprehensive review 
of the Nagoya Protocol’s implementation status for the last four 
years––due in late 2018––will be an important stepping stone to 
envisioning the future development of this new ecosystem.  
 
PRACTICE POINTERS 
 
▪ Potential stakeholders planning to access genetic materials 
are strongly encouraged to familiarize themselves with the 
developing standards of the Nagoya Protocol through the 
online Access and Benefit-Sharing Clearing-House. 
▪ As users of genetic resources, stakeholders are additionally 
expected to work closely with their foreign counterpart 
representing the country that is a Party to the Nagoya 
Protocol, and to exercise due diligence in obtaining 
information on domestic implementing measures of their 
jurisdiction for full legal compliance. 
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Figure 1. The Framework of the Nagoya Protocol.  
 
Under the Nagoya Protocol’s Access and Benefit-Sharing (“ABS”) scheme, 
acquiring genetic resources is subject to Prior Informed Consent (“PIC”) of the 
provider country. Benefit-sharing will be executed according to Mutually Agreed 
Terms (“MAT”). Each country designates National Focal Points, which provide 
information on ABS to stakeholders and administer domestic regulations. An 
Internationally Recognized Certificate of Compliance is issued by the Secretariat 
based on national permits granted by the Competent National Authority of the 
provider country and is published on the ABS Clearing-House. Designated 
national Checkpoints collect relevant information, and monitor and report on the 
utilization of genetic resources to support compliance and increase transparency. 
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